Recently Z. S. Zhang et al [Phys. Lett. A 356(2006)199] have proposed an one-way quantum identity authentication scheme and claimed that it can verify the user's identity and update securely the initial authentication key for reuse. In this paper we will show that, under an eavesdropper's intercept-measure-resend attack, Zhang et al's scheme is only a one-time-use scheme for the updated key can be eavesdropped. To fix this leak, we revise their protocol such that the authentication key can be securely updated for reuse.
With the rapid development of information technology, quantum cryptography [1, 2] has progressed fast in the past two decades and has been an important and attractive study area. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most interesting topics in quantum information processing, which provides a novel way for two legitimate parties to share a common secret key over a long distance with negligible leakage of information to an eavesdropper Eve. Its ultimate advantage is the unconditional security. Hence, after Bennett and Brassard's pioneering work published in 1984 [3] , much attentions have been focused on this topic and a variety of quantum communication protocols [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] have been proposed. Different from QKD, the deterministic quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol is to transit directly the secret message without first generating QKD to encrypt them. Hence it is very useful and usually desired, especially in some urgent time. Recently a few of deterministic secure direct communication protocols have been proposed [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] and some of them are essentially insecure[see [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Quantum secret sharing (QSS) [14, 15] is another important application of quantum mechanics in the field. The basic idea of classical secret sharing in the simplest case is that the sender Alice splits the secret message into two shares and distributes them to two receivers Bob and Charlie separately, such that only the two receivers collaborate can they reconstruct the secret message. Since QSS is likely to play a key role in protecting secret quantum information, e.g., in secure operations of distributed quantum computation, sharing difficult-to-construct ancillary states and joint sharing of quantum money, etc, so far a lot of works focused on this issue theoretically and experimentally .
The security of the above mentioned quantum cryptographic schemes is guaranteed by the law of quantum physics. The unconditional security of the quantum cryptographic scheme is only valid against passive eavesdropping attack strategy [43] [44] . Nevertheless, when suffering the active attacks, such as the impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack, the schemes cannot reach the unconditional security anymore [43] [44] . To prevent the active attack strategy, usually one thinks that quantum identity authentication (QIA) should be introduced beforehand. So far, several QIA schemes have been proposed by different groups using different methods [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] . Among them, one is the ZZZX scheme proposed very recently by Zhang et al [48] based on the ping-pong technique [16] . Zhang et al [48] claimed that their protocol can verify the user's identity and update securely the initial authentication key for reuse. However, we find the user's identity can only be authenticated only one time with the initial authentication key and the updated key is not secure and can not be used as an authentication key anymore under an eavesdropper Eve's intercept-measure-attack attack. In this paper we will first reveal this leak in their scheme and then modify their protocol such that the leak can be fixed. Moreover, we will point out that the entanglement in their protocol is not a necessary condition and suggest to use other ping-pong protocols without entanglement [18, 21] .
Let us now briefly review the one-way ZZZX quantum identity authentication (QIA) scheme [48] . The ZZZX QIA protocol consists of two parties, say, Alice and Bob. Alice is assumed to be a reliable certification authority (CA), while Bob is a common user whose identity needs to be verified when he communicates with Alice, or logins in a network where Alice is the authentication center. Suppose Alice and Bob has in prior shared a binary key K = {k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k 2n } as the authentication key. Since Alice is a reliable CA, only Bob's identity needs to be verified, which may be implemented by the following five-step protocol.
(S1) Preparing an EPR pair by the reliable CA. Alice generates two particles h and t in the state
The home particle h is kept in Alice's site while the travelling particle t is transmitted to Bob.
(S2) Encoding secret authentication information on photon by user's operations. Bob prepares an information particle m in the state |φ m = |k 2i−1 ⊕ k 2i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the symbol ⊕ represents modular 2 plus. After receiving the particle t, he executes a quantum controlled-NOT gate on the particles t and m to create a tri-particle entanglement state |Φ w = C p (|Ψ ⊗ |φ m ), where C p = C 0 at k 2i−1 = 0 and C p = C 1 at k 2i−1 = 1. Here C 0 and C 1 are defined as C 0 = |0 0| ⊗ I + |1 1| ⊗ σ x ,
After above operations, Bob preserves particle t and returns particle m to Alice.
(S3) Decoding the state of particle m by CA. After receiving the particle m, Alice performs a quantum controlled-NOT gate C p on the particles h and m. This operation induces |Φ ′ w = |Ψ ⊗ |φ m . (S4) Verifying identification of user. Having obtained the state |φ m , Alice measures particle m in the basis σ z . The measurement result can either be 0 or 1. For a legitimate user, the measurement result must be k 2i−1 ⊕ k 2i . If the measurement results in accord with the authentication key, i increases 1 and two communicators return to (S1) to authenticate next two key bits. If all the key bits have been authenticated, the user's identity is true.
(S5) Updating the authentication key. After the authentication of two bits, i.e., k 2i−1 k 2i , Alice and Bob update the two bits. Denote the updated key as k ′ 2i−1 k ′ 2i . Since the home particle h and the travelling particle t, which are kept secretly by Alice and Bob after the identity authentication, are in a maximally entangled state |Ψ , Alice and Bob's measurement results on home and travel particles are correlated. The first key bit k ′ 2i−1 is obtained by performing measurements on the home particle h and the travelling particle t, respectively. Bob measures the particle t in basis σ z , then the measurement result is just the bit k ′ 2i−1 in the updated key. Since Alice creates initially the state |Ψ , she knows exactly this key bit by measuring the home particle h. The second key bit k ′ 2i is determined by the first two bits of the old key and k ′ 2i−1 , that is, k ′ 2i = k 2i−1 ⊕ k 2i ⊕ k ′ 2i−1 . In Ref. [48] the authors claimed that, obviously, even if the attacker, Eve, has obtained the old key, she cannot obtain the new key (i.e., the updated key). We think their this statement is exaggerate, because we find that in their protocol Bob's identity can be authenticated only once with the initial authentication key and the updated key is not secure and can not be used as an authentication key anymore under an eavesdropper Eve's intercept-measure-attack attack. Eve's attack consists of two parts.
(P1) Getting the values of the bits with odd orderings in the updated key. This part is finished during the first authentication process using the initial secret authentication key. When Alice sends the travelling particle t to Bob to verify Bob's identity, Eve intercepts it. She measures it in the basis σ z . Eve's this measurement will collapse the original entangled state |Ψ = (|0 h 0 t +|1 h 1 t )/ √ 2 of particles h and t into the product state |i h i t (i ∈ {0, 1}). After the measurement, Eve resends the particle t to Bob.
In this case, both Alice and Bob can not find Eve's this attack and they will do all as usual. That is, Bob prepares an information particle m in the state |φ m and performs a quantum controlled-NOT gate on the particles t and m to create the tri-particle state |Φ w = C p (|i h i t ⊗|φ m ). After receiving the particle m, Alice carries out a same quantum controlled-NOT gate C p as Bob's on the particles h and m and gets |Φ ′ w = |i h i t ⊗ |φ m . Through measuring |φ m , Alice can successfully authenticated Bob's identity this time. Meanwhile, Alice and Bob believe that they can successfully update the initial authentication key and use this updated key for the next authentication. For the updated key, Alice and Bob get the values of the bits with odd orderings (i.e., k ′ 2i−1 s) through measuring the travelling particle m in basis σ z and the values of the bits with even orderings (i.e., k ′ 2i s) by the definition k ′ 2i = k 2i−1 ⊕ k 2i ⊕ k ′ 2i−1 . Unfortunately, Eve has already known the values of all the k ′ 2i−1 s (1 ≤ i ≤ n) through her measurements. This information is very important and useful for Eve's attack in the second part.
(P2) Getting the values of all the bits in the updated key. This part is completed during the second authentication process using the authentication key updated once. As same as in the first part, when Alice sends the travelling particle t to Bob to verify Bob's identity, Eve intercepts it. She measures it in the basis σ z . Through her this measurement she knows the mixing state of the particle t (also the particle h) has collapsed into which pure state (either |0 or |1 ). Then she prepares two same particles each in this pure state. She then sends one of them (say, particle t) to Bob and keeps another (say, particle t ′ ). In this case, both Alice and Bob can not find Eve's this attack. Bob performs a quantum controlled-NOT gate C p on particles t and m in terms of the value of k ′ 2i−1 as usual. However, since Eve has known the k ′ 2i−1 s in the updated key according to her first part attack, she knows Bob's this quantum controlled-NOT gate C p operation. When Bob sends the particle m to Alice, Eve intercepts it. She performs a same quantum controlled-NOT gate C p on the particles t ′ and m. Eve's this quantum operation recovers the initial state of the particle m, i.e., |φ m = |k ′ 2i−1 ⊕ k ′ 2i . Therefore, Eve can measure this state in the basis σ z to get the value of k ′ 2i−1 ⊕ k ′ 2i . Since she has already known the k ′ 2i−1 s before, obviously now she also gets the k ′ 2i s. This means that Eve has successfully got the authentication key updated once. By repeating this part, Eve can obtain the authentication key updated any times.
Once Eve gets the authentication key, it is very easy for her to cheat Alice, that is, she performs the same quantum operation on the particles t ′ and m again and resends it to Alice. In this case, both Alice and Bob can not find Eve's eavesdropping.
So far we have shown how an eavesdropper adopts an intercept-measure-resend attack strategy to attack the quantum channel without being detected and steal the authentication key updated once. This means that the original version of the ZZZX QIA scheme [48] is only a one-time-use QIA scheme. To fix this leak, we revise their protocol such that the intercept-measure-resend attack can be prevented and the authentication key can be updated any times for reuse. Our modifications only occur in the step 5.
(S5') Updating the authentication key. After the authentication of two bits, i.e., k 2i−1 k 2i , Alice and Bob update the two bits. Denote the updated key as k ′ 2i−1 k ′ 2i . The key bit k ′ 2i instead of the key bit k ′ 2i−1 in the original ZZZX QIA scheme is obtained by performing measurements on the home particle h and the travelling particle t, respectively. In the original ZZZX QIA scheme [48] , Alice and Bob are limited to use the basis σ z to measure the particles h and m, respectively. This is a known and useful information for Eve. However, in our revised version, such constraint is released. Bob (Alice) measures the particle t(h) in which basis is completely determined by the value of k 2i . If k 2i = 0, then Bob (Alice) measures the particle t(h) in the basis σ z , otherwise he (she) uses the basis σ x = {|+ , |− }. In this case, the information about the measuring basis is not known but ambiguous for Eve. Bob's measurement result is just the bit k ′ 2i in the updated key. Here we emphasize again that the measurement outcome is taken as the bit k ′ 2i−1 in Zhang et al's original scheme [48] instead of the bit k ′ 2i in our revised version. Our this modification is very important for protection from Eve's attack, as can be seen later. Since the home particle h and the travelling particle t after the identity authentication are in a maximally entangled state |Ψ , Alice and Bob's measurement results on home and travel particles are correlated. Alice measures the home particle h using the same measuring basis as Bob's and can know Bob's measurement outcome (i.e., k ′ 2i ). The bit k ′ 2i−1 is determined by the first two bits of the old key and
In the original ZZZX QIA scheme, it is k ′ 2i is determined by a definition. Our this change is also important for preventing Eve's attack, as we will explain later. Now let us analyze why the modifications can prevent Eve's attack. Since Eve does not know the bit k 2i , she can not know after the authentication which basis Alice and Bob will use to measure the particles h and t, respectively. Therefore, she can not know the bit k ′ 2i in terms of her first part attack. In this case, obviously Eve also can not know the bit k ′ 2i−1 . As a consequence, in her second part attack, she does not know which quantum controlled-NOT operation she should perform on the the particles t ′ and m. As indicates that she can not let the particle m be in the state |φ m = |k ′ 2i−1 ⊕ k ′ 2i via her operation. Thus, she can not obtain the value of k ′ 2i−1 ⊕ k ′ 2i . By far, all these have shown that Eve's two-part attack fails completely. Alternatively, our modifications can effectively prevent the intercept-measure-resent attack and the initial authentication key is successfully updated for reuse.
Incidentally, we want to emphasize that in the ZZZX QIA scheme, the entanglement is not necessary.
We have already shown that, if the entanglement is disentangled via measurement, the scheme can also work. Zhang et al [48] have stated their scheme is based on ping-pong technique for photons. Hence, it is better to employ the ping-pong protocols without entanglement [18, 21] instead of that using entanglements [16] .
To summarize, in this paper we have shown that if an eavesdropper adopts an intercept-measureresend attack strategy, in the ZZZX QIA scheme [48] the authentication key updated once can be completely eavesdropped. To fix this leak, we have modified their protocol such that the authentication key can be securely updated for reuse. In addition, we also mention that the entanglement in their protocol is not necessary and suggest to use other ping-pong protocols without entanglement.
